ABSTRACT In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyse the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove & Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan & Thisse (2002) , who use similar models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose.
Introduction
The seminal paper of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) has been an important attempt to model the effect of nations' size differences in international trade flows using Hotelling's framework of spatial competition. Their paper studies the trade and welfare effects of opening a closed border between two neighbouring nations of different size. The authors assume mill-pricing and fixed locations. First, they analyse the price and welfare in autarky and after that they assume that the border opens. Finally, they compare the price and welfare effects between autarky and free trade. In contrast to traditional trade theory or the new economic geography, the country size is not dimensionless and not solely represented by population size. Here, country size is modelled in terms of geographical extension. The analysis of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) suggests that the small country always gains from free trade, while opening to free trade is not necessarily beneficial to the large country. The smaller country is able to gain from trade, because of its ability to expand its market share. Under certain assumptions on the locations of the firms, the analyzed Nash equilibrium in Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) does not exist, as Tharakan (2001) shows. The spatial setup of the Shachmurove-Spiegel-Model validates the stability-conditions in the Hotelling model with linear transportation costs imposed by d 'Aspremont et al. (1979) . To recover stability of equilibrium Tharakan and Thisse (2002) extend the model with quadratic transportation costs. The results show that, in the case of quadratic transportation costs, the smaller country gains more from free trade than the larger country. This result is even stronger than in the case of linear transportation costs. 1 Another possibility to avoid the existence problem is to assume spatial discrimination. In Tharakan (2001) , the author assumes that firms use spatial price discrimination as pricing policy. The analysis indicates that while the small country gains from opening up to free trade, the large country's welfare is unpersuaded. However, there is reasonable doubt about the use of Bertrand pricing policy. Greenhut (1981) shows, in an empirical study, that the delivered prices of real-world firms did not resemble Bertrand schedules. The predictions of the Cournot model in terms of delivered prices have been verified by Greenhut et al. (1980) in a representative sample.
Theoretical support for the use of the Cournot model with spatial discrimination is given in Greenhut et al. (1991) , as well as in Anderson and Neven (1991) . The latter argue that the Cournot assumption should be reasonable when the quantity (or capacity) decision is inflexible, contrary Bertrand competition is relevant if price decisions are less flexible than quantity decisions. Another important issue, concerning the use of Cournot instead of Bertrand in spatial models is the fact that markets overlap in Cournot and (all) market points are served by both firms. If we want to model markets where overlapping is unrealistic and a (sub)market is only served by a single firm, we should use Bertrand spatial discrimination.
The purpose of this paper is to extend Shachmurove and Spiegel's model to make the analysis possible and compare the results with the results of the above described existing corrections by Tharakan and Thisse (2002) and Tharakan (2001) . We use a similar setup where a firm's apply spatial discrimination in the sense of Cournot. Instead of an inelastic demand we use a more realistic elastic demand function and linear transportation costs. We want to investigate the gains and losses associated with the opening to trade. Here, it is of primary interest to verify the hypothesis of an advantage of being small. In particular, we find that with long-run firm locations the large country gains from free trade and the overall welfare in the small country is lower compared to the autarky equilibrium. This result is contrary to the results found by Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) , Tharakan (2001) and Tharakan and Thisse (2002) , where the small country gains from free trade. The reason for this finding is the agglomeration of the Cournot firms at the centre of the market. 2 If nation's size differs, the firm located in the small country in autarky always relocates in the large country in the long run. 3 Clearly, this result is obtained in a very particular model, but we can show that the gains and losses of opening to free trade depend crucially on market conditions and firm's behaviour. This paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the theoretical model. The comparison between autarky and free trade is done in Section 3. A simple extension to analyse the effect of a profit transfer from the firm, previously located in the small country, to the small country is given in Section 4. The final section concludes.
The Model
Similar to Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) we study first the autarky case. Therefore, we assume two closed economies with a border between them. The countries differ only in size, size h for the small country and size 1 − h for the large country. 4 There is just one firm in each country. The second scenario analyses the effect of free trade. The border opens and the firms compete in the whole market. The basic difference between our model and the model used by Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) is a different approach in dealing with the long run equilibrium. In our model, relocation is possible and therefore firms choose their optimal locations after opening to trade. 5 We use this model setup to analyse the trade and welfare effects of free trade compared with autarky ( Figure 1 ). In the spirit of Hotelling (1929) , we study a sub-game perfect equilibrium with location choice as the first stage. In the second stage the firm sets its quantity at a particular location. The model is solved using backward induction in both scenarios. 6 The firms sell a homogeneous product and face the same linear transport costs of t per unit to ship one unit of the product from its own location to a consumer. Production involves constant marginal costs (without loss of generality production costs are normalized to zero). We assume that firms are able to discriminate between customers since they control transportation. The location of the firm in the small country is denoted as a and in the large country as 1 − b. We assume that there are no costs of relocating. 7 Both countries have the same uniform distribution of consumers over the market space and all consumers have identical preferences. A consumer's location in the small country is indexed by x ∈ [0, h] and in the large country by x ∈ [h, 1]. Each point generates an inverse demand p(x) = 1 − q(x), where p is the price of the homogeneous good and q is the total quantity offered to consumers at that point. 8 Obviously we have to assume 0 < h < 1/2 to make sure that both countries differ in size. To ensure, that both firms serve the whole market in free trade and to avoid the case of local monopolies we follow Hamilton et al. (1989) and restrict the transport cost to t = 1/2. We will call this condition the whole market condition. 9
Autarky
First, autarky is assumed in both countries. The two firms are both a monopoly in their country. In case of monopoly it makes no difference between setting prices or quantities. We analyse the quantity setting. Small country. The profit earned by the firm in the small country is given by 10
Under the assumptions the monopoly is able to maximize profit at every location separately. Standard calculations yield the following profit maximizing quantity at location x:
Furthermore, the resulting price schedule is
These results indicate, that monopoly price and the quantity equal 1/2 at location a = x. We can find the profit maximizing location by substituting the equilibrium quantity in the profit function and differentiating with respect to a. The monopoly chooses the transport cost minimizing location:
Substitution of equations (2), (3) and (4) into equation (1) 
The aggregate consumer surplus by using linear demand yields
Overall welfare in the small country is the sum of aggregate consumer surplus and monopoly profit, which yields
Large country. The profit of the monopoly in the large country is given by
Profit maximizing quantity at location x is
The optimal price for the monopoly is
Calculation of the optimal location yields
Again, the monopoly is located at the centre of the market, where the transport costs are minimized.
Using equations (9), (10) and (11), the profit of the monopoly can be written as *
Using linear demand, the aggregate consumer surplus is given by
Overall welfare in the large country is the sum of aggregate consumer surplus and monopoly profit, which yields
Global welfare. Global welfare is simply the sum of welfare in the small and in the large country, that is
Free Trade with Quantity Competition
After getting the results of the autarky scenario in Section 2.1, we turn to the free trade case. The border, located at h, is opened and both firms compete in quantities at each point in the integrated market. Since production costs are constant and arbitrage is nonbinding the firms determine separate quantities for each location, which are strategically independent. In the second stage, each firm chooses a profit maximizing quantity schedule given its rival schedule, for fixed locations a and b. In the first stage, given the equilibrium quantity schedules, each firm chooses a location to maximize their profit given its rival's choice. The quantity equilibrium. The profit of the firms are written as 11 *
and *
Direct computation of the Cournot equilibrium yields
11 We use the notation f for free trade. Again, capital letters indicate the large country.
and
Using these results, the delivered price schedule is
If the whole market condition holds, each firm will supply all consumers. The distribution of the output quantities among firms at any point depends on their spatial locations: at any consumer point, the firm that is closer to that point will have a larger market share.
The location equilibrium. We use the equilibrium quantity schedules to find the first-stage location equilibrium. Each firm chooses a location to maximize profits given its rival's location. The firm's total profit function for the location game are as follows:
The first-order condition for the maximization of firm f 's profit is Therefore the first-order condition is satisfied for both firms at the central location: a * = b * = 1/2 (24) The second-order condition is written as
The second-order condition is strictly negative. We can see that central agglomeration is an equilibrium with spatial discrimination and quantity competition. 13 12 The other solution gives a = 5/2, which is outside the market. However, if both firms are located at the same point and produce a homogeneous product, it is beneficial for them to merge and maximize joint profits. We assume that this merging is forbidden by an antitrust authority in the large country. 13 Gupta et al. (1997) show that the agglomeration result depends on the assumed uniform distribution of consumers. They show that if population density is thin at the centre, then central agglomeration never occurs in Cournot competition. The Cournot equilibrium is described through equations (18), (19), (20) and (24). 14 Using these results it is possible to observe that trade flows from the large to the small country. Here it is the country size that determines the direction of trade. Welfare in the small country. As derived above, after opening the border, the former monopoly relocates at the centre of the new market, which is given by [0,1]. Since h < 1/2 the firm relocates inside the large country. The remaining overall welfare of the small country is therefore only the consumer surplus in that country, i.e.
Welfare in the large country. The overall welfare in the large country is the sum of consumer surplus in the large country and the profits of both firms, because they are both located in the large country. Consumer surplus in the large country is written as
Because of symmetry, both firms earn the same profit in equilibrium. The profits are calculated using equations (18), (19), (20) and (24) Global Welfare in free trade. As in the autarky case, the global welfare is simply the sum of the welfare in the large country and the welfare in the small country:
Comparison
The characterisation of the autarky and the free trade equilibrium enables the analysis of the welfare consequences resulting from opening the border to international trade. We compare the changes in profits, consumer surpluses and welfare.
Changes in profits.
The opening of the border changes two important aspects for both firms: market size and competition. The first aspect is positive for the profit of a firm: if the whole market condition holds, both firms supply a larger market. The second aspect is negative, because the firm faces competitive pressure instead of a monopoly position. Proof. For the proof, see the appendix.
The profit change for the firm is positive provided the small country is not too 'large'. If the small country is nearly as large as the large country, then the monopoly profit in the small market exceeds the free trade profit. If the small country is indeed small, then the profit change is always positive due to the larger market.
Proposition 2 Assuming that the whole market condition holds, under free trade, the profit change for the large country firm is always negative.
Proof. The change of the large country firm is negative, if * F − * M = 9h 3 +81h 2 +243h−185 1728 < 0, this is approximately satisfied for all h < 0.62299. The profit change for the firm in the large country is always negative, because of the competitive pressure. It is easy to show that the overall profit change is negative as well for all values of h.
For consumer surplus, we have the following. As is often the case, free trade leads to reduced prices. The change of the equilibrium price influences the change of the consumer surplus.
Finally we can analyse the effect for overall welfare. The result for the small country can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
Under free trade the overall welfare change in the small country is negative.
Proof. The overall welfare change is
The explanation for this change is, because the small country firm relocates into the large country and thus, the overall welfare in the small country depends only on consumer surplus. However, this result contradicts neo-classical trade theory of international trade. There, a country either gains or is indifferent to international trade. Here this is not the case, because the small country has a higher overall welfare in autarky. The relocation argument might be a strong reason for policymakers to keep up barriers to trade.
For the large country we have the following.
Proposition 5
Overall welfare change is positive in the large country.
Proof. If the joint overall welfare change is positive (Proposition 6) and the welfare change in the small country is negative (Proposition 4), then the welfare change in the large country is necessarily positive.
As argued above, the welfare change is positive, because the consumer surplus rises and the sum of the profits of both firms is larger than the monopoly profit for the firm in the large country alone. We can see that
The remaining question is the change of the overall joint welfare.
Proposition 6
The joint overall welfare change is positive.
Proof. This result is derived by W * f +F − W * m+M = 1 3456 (567h 2 − 567h + 185) > 0 for any values 0 < h < 1/2.
The welfare gain in the large country over-compensates the welfare loss in the small country, because the resulting market structure is more efficient than the monopolistic structure in autarky.
However, the results show that trade is globally efficient. Free trade leads to a higher welfare than autarky. But free trade is not preferable for both countries, since the small country loses in this model setup.
Extension
The results derived above depend on the assumption that all profits of the firm, which previously was located in the small country, will go solely to the large country. This can be motivated by the migration of the firm owner to the large country. Because this is a simplifying assumption, in the following discussion we analyse the case where part of the profit of the firm remains in the large country and the rest is transferred into the small country. A possible reason for this could be, that a share of the ownership of the firm remains in the small country. 15 We replace equations (26) and (29) with
The part of the firms' profit that is transferred to the small country is denoted by λ. This parameter is restricted to 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. If λ = 0 the whole profit remains in the large county, since no transfer exists. If λ = 1 the whole profit is channelled out of the large country. In this case full ownership of the firm, formerly located in the small country, must stay in the small country and is unaffected through relocation. The case 0 < λ < 1 corresponds to mixed ownership structures, where a part of the profit is transferred.
Comparing the welfare in the small country leads to
The welfare difference may be positive, negative or zero. Setting equation (33) equal to zero and solving for λ, we find
If λ > λ f ,crit , welfare with free trade is larger than in autarky. If on the other hand λ < λ f ,crit overall welfare in the small country is lower after engaging in trade. We conclude that, if there exists a transfer of the firms' profit after engaging in trade, overall welfare in the small country might rise. The change in the large country is given by
Setting equation (35) equal to zero and solving for λ yields
If λ < λ F,crit , , welfare of the large country increases after opening the border. The case λ > λ F,crit , corresponds to lower overall welfare in the large country. Figure 2 summarizes the welfare effects depending on λ and h. The large country benefits from free trade in most cases, only in the special case of a low country size h and high transfers to the small country does a loss arises.
The small country is better off after opening the border, if country size h is very small. This result holds even if the part of the profit that is transferred is very small (but larger than zero). If the small country is relatively large engaging in free trade becomes less attractive, even if a large part of the profit is transferred. However, it is worth pointing out, that the area below the λ F,crit -curve and above the λ f ,crit -curve corresponds to the case, in which both countries benefit from engaging in free trade.
Conclusions
This paper constructs a model of international trade using the Hotelling framework. We follow the approach of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) and change the model using a spatial discriminating Cournot duopoly. The results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002) indicate, that the small country gains from trade. By a change in the model assumptions we reverse the distributional results and find that the large country gains having free trade, while the small country is worse off. We find that consumer surplus and global welfare is higher in the free trade case than in autarky. Furthermore, trade flows from the large to the small country.
However, our results are, similar to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) and Tharakan and Thisse (2002) , obtained in the context of very specific assumptions. We consider a single dimensional space and uniform linear demand.
One assumption that is crucial for our results is the restriction on the transportation costs. If we allow for larger transportation costs, the market would support isolated sellers as local monopolies. Clearly there would be no agglomeration in this context and the results of the model would change. The discussion of possible profit transfers shows that welfare effects depend crucially on the ownership structure of the firms.
The model has interesting consequences regarding the gains and losses of free trade. Especially if we compare our results with the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) and Tharakan and Thisse (2002) , we see that further work needs to be done to understand the impact of geographical size and industrial organization for trade and welfare effects across countries.
